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1. Introduction 
What ought to happen legally when multiple states and international organisations (IOs or 
organisations) participate in an institutionally thick cooperative venture that subsequently 
engages in wrongdoing? To whom should such wrongdoing be attributed?  
The question is a pressing one. States and organisations are engaging with increasing frequency 
in cooperative enterprises of growing sophistication. The pursuit of international law’s core 
objectives of peace, security, justice, human rights, and development depends on that trend 
continuing and perhaps accelerating.1 Yet the legal regime of responsibility for wrongs that occur 
in the course international cooperation remains disturbingly immature. 2  Responding to that 
lacuna, this Chapter proposes a way of thinking about responsibility for a particular form of 
cooperative action – what I term here the joint public enterprise (JPE). My claim is that the 
normative principle underpinning the ex post attribution of JPE wrongdoing should be that of 
reciprocity between public power and preventive responsibility. Enterprise wrongs ought to be 
attributed to the participant states or organisations that hold the levers of control most relevant to 
preventing the type of wrongdoing in question.3 The proposal has two primary virtues. First, it 
* Lecturer in Human Rights, University College London. 
1 Many of the greatest threats to those objectives (adapted from the UN Charter’s preamble) demand collaborative 
solutions. Consider: mass atrocity, terrorism, depleting fishing stocks, climate change, wrongdoing by multinational 
corporations, refugee flows, peacekeeping, transnational wars, piracy, water resources, and global health.  
2 Independent responsibility remains dominant. Commentary to the Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA Commentary) at 64; Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA). See also P.A. 
Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law’ (2013) 34 MIJIL 359; I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 457; J.E. Noyes and B.D. Smith, ‘State 
Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability’ (1998) 13 YJIL 225, at 225. 
3 This expands and deepens earlier arguments on attribution in UN peacekeeping. T. Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the 
Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’ (2010) 51 Harv ILJ 113, at 156-83; T. 
Dannenbaum, ‘Finding Balance in the Attribution of Liability for the Human Rights Violations of U.N. 
Peacekeepers’ (2010) 51 Harv ILJO 69; T. Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to 
Prevent Unlawful Conduct’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 713, at 719-27. 
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aligns ex post attribution in JPEs with a deep moral principle that already undergirds state 
responsibility in unilateral contexts. Second, it strikes the right balance between preventing 
wrongdoing and encouraging cooperation. 
Sections 2-3 define the question and identify the alternative answers advanced thus far. Sections 
4 and 5 then seek a guiding normative principle to select among those alternatives. Here, I look 
not to articulate and defend a moral account from the ground up, untethered to extant law, but 
instead to understand and build on the existing normative substructure of some of the better-
elaborated areas of state responsibility under international law. Running through the doctrines of 
preventive due diligence, the responsibility to protect, and the attribution of state organs’ conduct 
is a common normative thread: asserting legitimate public power entails a reciprocal duty to 
prevent wrongdoing of global concern. The immanence of this principle in more developed 
adjacent domains of the law gives it two advantages as a foundational tenet of JPE attribution: 
legitimacy in a world of plural values and a preliminary promise of viability. The final two 
sections elaborate and then hone a JPE attribution regime built on this principle. 
 
2. Why JPEs? Why attribution? Why wrongdoing? 
Before proceeding to the core argument, it is necessary to define and justify its scope, starting 
with its focus on JPEs. JPEs arise when multiple states or international organisations cooperate to 
form a public organ or venture with partially merged processes of decision-making and action. 
Unlike international organisations, however, JPEs lack full legal personality, and are ordinarily 
temporary. 4  Classic examples include first, ‘common organs’ – public entities created 
collectively by a number of states or organisations to act on their behalf, like the trusteeship 
administration of Nauru;5 and second, multilateral operations in which states place their organs at 
the disposal of another state, international organisation, or group thereof, such as peacekeeping 
4 Cf. Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, ILC Report on the work of its sixty-third session, 
UNGAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011) (ARIO); Commentary to the Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, ILC Report on the work of its sixty-third session, UNGAOR 66th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011) (ARIO Commentary), at 52-172, paras. 87-88, Article 2(a) ARIO; 
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 174. 
5  ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 44, 64, 124. On Nauru, see Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. 
Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1992, 240.  
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operations and multinational military forces. 6 Today, JPEs also include ventures that fit into 
neither of those classic paradigms. Frontex operations, for example, involve cooperation between 
an European Union (EU) agency, a host state, and personnel contributors in which all three 
exercise some autonomy, despite the host’s formal supremacy.7 Other examples include ventures 
like the Joint Investigation Team in which German, Dutch, and Europol participants engage in 
merged police and investigative operations,8 and the Tilburg prison (rented from the Netherlands 
by Belgium, staffed by Dutch guards, and run by a Belgian Prison Director).9 JPEs may operate 
extraterritorially for all participants,10 extraterritorially for active participants at the invitation of a 
passive host,11 or on an active participant’s territory.12 
Key features distinguish JPE wrongdoing from other shared wrongdoing. First, unlike non-
collaborative aggregations of independent wrongdoing,13 collective failures to engage in required 
cooperation, 14  or contributory fault, 15  JPEs are cooperative. Second, unlike collaborations 
6  Article 6 ARSIWA, n. 2. Peacekeeping includes not just UN, but also regional operations, see UN Doc. 
S/RES/1671 (25 April 2006) (authorising an EU mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ((DRC)); and UN 
Doc. S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012) (authorising an ECOWAS mission in Mali). For multi-national military 
forces under unified command, see UN Doc. S/RES/2098 (28 March 2013) (authorising a UN-led force in the eastern 
DRC); and UN Doc. S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001) (authorising a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ((NATO))-
led force in Afghanistan); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect (2001) ch. 7 (ICISS Report). NATO and the UN used a dual-key process in Bosnia. UN Doc. S/RES/836 (4 
June 1993), para. 10. 
7 I. Mann, The EU’s Dirty Hands (Human Rights Watch, 2011), at 10-18, 38-45 (on Frontex in Greece).  
8 Netherlands Ministry of Defense, Press Release, ‘German-Dutch Team Join Forces Against Pirates’, 23 November 
2011. 
9 Government of the Netherlands, Press Release, ‘Lower House Agrees to Placement of Belgian Detainees in 
Tilburg’, 19 January 2010. 
10 UN Doc. S/RES/678 (29 November 1990); UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011). 
11 This is the case in the classic peacekeeping mission. 
12 Frontex missions take this form, but also involve high seas operations. E. Papastavidris, ‘“Fortress Europe and 
FRONTEX”: Within or Without International Law?’ (2010) 79 Nord JIL 75. 
13 Compare the failures of hostile Russia and Moldova to secure detainee rights in Transdniestria. ,ODúFX and others 
v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), paras. 352, 385, 393. See also Corfu Channel 
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Merits, ICJ Report 1949, 4, at 15-23, 36; 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible?’ Doc. 12895 
(5 April 2012); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, in force 7 December 1979, 1125 UNTS 
3, Article 51(7)-(8). On the cumulative/cooperative distinction: Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in 
International Law’, n. 2, at 368-9; Noyes and Smith, ‘State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several 
Liability’, n. 2, at 228-30. On climate change: M.G. Faure and P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an 
Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change’ (2007) 43 Stan JIL 123; and J.W. Dellapenna, 
‘International Water Law in a Climate of Disruption’ (2008) 17 MSUJIL 43, at 68-76.  
14 States must cooperate to combat jus cogens violations, protect the environment, and further development. See 
Article 41 ARSIWA, n. 2; *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 7, 
paras. 112-13, 141-43; Rio Declaration, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) Principles 5, 7, 9, 11-14, 19; United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 1833 
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between a state or international organisation and entities lacking international legal personality, 
JPEs involve multiple participants with full international legal personality.16 Third, JPEs’ merged 
structure of action distinguishes them both from collaborative but independent action,17 and from 
scenarios in which the decisions of a merged entity are implemented independently.18  
These distinctions emphasise why JPEs pose a unique problem for ex post attribution. In most 
shared international wrongs, it is relatively straightforward to isolate the conduct of each state or 
organisation and thus solve the first-order problem of attribution. The key challenges in those 
other contexts are instead those of first, apportioning liability when the aggregation of those 
distinguishable state and international organisation acts leads to a single harm, and second, 
determining the scope of vicarious responsibility among states and international organisations. 19 
JPEs are different. The issue is not just ‘who pays for the damage?’ but ‘who do we understand to 
have committed the wrong?’ The uniquely thorny nature of that question warrants focusing on 
JPE attribution in isolation. 
Finally among matters of scope, I use the term wrongs (rather than legal breaches) purposely to 
UNTS 3 (LOSC), Articles 194, 197, 199-200, 207-208, 210-212; Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (1986) Articles 3-4; UN Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976, 993 
UNTS 3, Articles 2(1), 11(1), 23. 
15 Article 39 ARSIWA, n. 2; Article 39 ARIO, n. 4.  
16 For examples of collaboration between states and entities lacking international legal personality, see text and 
sources at n. 59-61, below; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, paras. 235-241 
(Bosnian Genocide case). 
17 Refoulement provides one classic example, see discussion and sources at n. 71, below. Another involves one state 
allowing another to use its territory to do wrong. Definition of Aggression, UN Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (14 
December 1974) Article 3(f); El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 
(ECtHR, 13 December 2012), para. 206. More generally, see Article 16 ARSIWA, n. 2; Bosnian Genocide, ibid., 
paras. 416-24. 
18 This crucial distinction is not always noticed. See, for example, N. Gal-Or and C. Ryngaert, ‘From Theory to 
Practice: Exploring the Relevance of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
(DARIO) – The Responsibility of the WTO and the UN’ (2012) 13 GLJ 511, at 513. A number of prominent cases 
touching on the independent implementation of collective decisions have arisen recently. For example: Bosphorus 
+DYD<ROODUL7XUL]P9H7LFDUHW$QRQLPùLUNHWLv. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005), paras. 137, 
152-56; Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351, joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P; Commission v. Kadi [2013] 
ECR Case C-584/10 P, C 593/10 P, C 595/10 P (2013); Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 
September 2012). See also ARIO, n. 4, at 105-10.  
19 Distinguishing ex post attribution and ex post liability, see Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in 
International Law’, n. 2, at 414; R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental 
Harm’, in F. Francioni and T Scovazzi (eds.), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (London: 
Graham and Trotman, 1991), 15. 
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single out illegal action of public concern to the global community.20 The legal category of duties 
erga omnes provides doctrinal substance to this concept.21 However, in addition to the narrow list 
elaborated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) thus far, 22  I include aspects of 
environmental law, the full corpus of human rights, and the humanitarian aspects of the laws of 
war.23 
I focus on global wrongs for three reasons.24 First, because they cause ‘irreparable harm’, the 
consequentialist imperative is prevention, more than compensation.25 Second, because attributing 
wrongdoing entails public condemnation (rather than merely bilateral responsibility), it should be 
rooted in a robust underlying institutional moral responsibility. Third, whereas liability 
apportionment is central to the private dimension of ex post responsibility, attribution is its public 
dimension.26 
 
20 P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International Responsibility’ (2009) 6 
Indiana JGLS 535 (on the ‘public or constitutional’ dimension of international law); and N.H.B. Jorgensen, The 
Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford: OUP, 2000) (on state crimes). The ILC repudiates 
public/private or civil/criminal distinctions in international law. ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 55, 111. However, 
this sits uneasily with the recognition (and even special status) it accords erga omnes and jus cogens. ARSIWA 
Commentary, n. 2, at 33, 56, 110-16, 126-28. 
21 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, 
para. 33 (Barcelona Traction); C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the 
International Legal Order (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). 
22 Ibid., Barcelona Traction, para. 34 (including prohibitions on aggression, genocide, and violations of ‘basic 
[human] rights’ like slavery and racial discrimination); East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1995, 90, para. 29 (adding self-determination).  
23 On environmental law: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in 
force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107, preamble and Article 3(1); M.H. Arsanjani and W.M. Reisman, ‘The Quest 
for an International Liability Regime for the Protection of the Global Commons’, in K. Wellens (ed.), International 
Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), 469; Rapporteur F. Orrego Vicuña, Responsibility and Liability Under 
International Law for Environmental Damage, Institut de Droit International (1997), Articles 23, 28. On human 
rights: Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 2. 
Human rights and humanitarian law are central to the ‘humanisation’ or ‘moralisation’ of international law. R. Teitel, 
Humanity’s Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011); T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2006); Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law’, n. 2, at 372-74; Nollkaemper, 
‘Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International Responsibility’, n. 20, at 540. Their protection from 
countermeasures emphasises the awkwardness of forcing these norms into a bilateral responsibility regime. Article 
50 ARSIWA, n. 2.  
24 Despite the doctrinal failure to categorise along these lines, the deeper normative distinction between public and 
private international legal breaches demands separate analysis and treatment. Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared 
Responsibility in International Law’, n. 2, at 372-373, 405, 408. 
25 See L.A. Kornhauser, ‘Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm’, in P.A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs 
(eds.), this volume, at___. While irreparable harms are not necessarily public wrongs, public wrongs are inherently 
irreparable.  
26 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law’, n. 2, at 414. 
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3. Doctrinal dissension  
Currently on the table in one form or another are five approaches to attributing JPE wrongdoing: 
authorial control, operational control, blanket multiple attribution, the Nicaragua interpretation of 
‘effective control’, and the broader interpretation of ‘effective control’ that I have advocated 
elsewhere and elaborate here – call it ‘preventive control’.27 Sections 4-6 identify the normative 
principle that ought to guide attribution and explain why the first four approaches fall short in 
that respect. To frame that discussion, this section sketches the alternative attribution regimes and 
the rationales offered for each. For the most part, the rebuttal of these rationales is left for section 
6. 
The authorial control test holds that if a JPE exists pursuant to the authorisation and delegation of 
one or more of the participants, enterprise conduct is to be considered the conduct of those 
authorial participants and none of the others. Thus, in Behrami, the ECtHR attributed the conduct 
of United Nations (UN)-authorised, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led troops in 
Kosovo exclusively to the UN (and not to NATO or any state participant). 28 The ILC also 
advocates an authorial control standard, although only for the narrower category of ‘common 
organs’, like the Nauru trusteeship managed by Australia but authorised by Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom (UK).29 A few other courts and states have adopted or asserted 
this test.30 The rationale is that it reflects the authorial entity’s ‘obligation to ensure that it can 
27 See sources cited at n. 3, above. 
28 Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v. France and Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No. 
71412/01 and App. No. 78166/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007), paras. 132-41. Initially, the Court continued with this 
‘ultimate authority and control’ test. Kasumaj v. Greece, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 6974/05 (ECtHR, 7 July 
2007); *DMLüY*HUPDQ\, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 31446/02 (28 August 2007). More recently, it hedged on 
whether to persist with ‘ultimate authority and control’ or to use ‘effective control’ (discussed below) for British 
troops’ conduct in the UN-authorised force in Iraq. Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08 (ECtHR, 7 
July 2011), para. 84.  
29  ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 64, 124; R. Ago, ‘Seventh Report on State Responsibility’, ILC Yearbook 
1978/II(2), at 99. On Nauru, see Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, n. 5, paras. 45-47; Ibid., Separate Opinion of 
Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 4; Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru (Australia - UK - New Zealand), 
approved by the UNGA on 1 November 1947, 10 UNTS 3. Crawford describes the three states as ‘acting as a 
collective’. J. Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law’(2006) 319 CCHAIL 325, at 336. 
The case was settled by Australia and Nauru, obviating final judgment. Agreement between Australia and the 
Republic of Nauru for the Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice concerning Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru, Nauru, 10 August 1993, in force 20 August 1993, 1770 UNTS 379. The UK and New Zealand 
contributed to Australia’s payment. Except in the context of common organs, the ILC rejects authorial control 
[ARIO, n. 4, at 87-88, 110] as does the UN Secretariat. Ibid., at 110.  
30 Anglo-Chinese Shipping v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Fed Cl 1955); Eurotunnel Arbitration (The Channel 
Tunnel Group Ltd & France-Manche S.A. v. the Secretary of State for Transport of the Government of the United 
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exercise effective authority and control over the way in which its delegated powers are being 
exercised.’31  
Although also emphasising formal hierarchy, the second approach attributes enterprise conduct to 
the entity with operational command and control, whether or not it is the authorial entity. In 
2008, the District Court in The Hague applied this test to impute the acts of the Dutch 
peacekeeping battalion at Srebrenica to the UN.32 The rulings have since been reversed,33 but the 
standard remains popular and is asserted by the UN and troop-contributing states in most 
peacekeeping operations.34  
Some advocates of this standard claim that holding contributing states responsible for wrongs 
occurring in a mission under another entity’s operational control would deter contributions, 
undermining valuable international cooperation.35 This position is misleading. By the same logic, 
effective attribution to the entity with operational control would undermine the very same 
ventures by deterring states and International Organisations from adopting an operational 
leadership role. In peacekeeping, the latter danger is obviated by UN immunity. 36 But that 
‘solution’ entails eviscerating the proscription of such wrongs in the context of international 
cooperation. Rather than articulating a defensible attribution framework, its supporters are really 
advocating attribution to no one.37 A genuine rationale for the operational control test would 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and le ministre de l’équipement, des transports, de l’aménagement 
du territoire, du tourisme et de la mer du Gouvernement de la République française), Partial Award, (2007) 132 ILR 
1, para. 179; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Transcript, CR 1999/25 (12 May 
1999), at 16 (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia advocating authorial control). 
31 D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 164. 
32  +DVDQ 1XKDQRYLü v. Netherlands, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BF0181 (Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 10 September 
2008) (1XKDQRYLü District Court). Identifying the ‘operational command and control’ test, see ibid., para. 4.9. This 
basis for attribution would have been countered only if the Netherlands had ‘cut across’ UN command, directing 
Dutchbat ‘to ignore’ or ‘to go against’ UN orders. Ibid., para. 4.14.1. 
33 See sources cited at n. 44, below. 
34 ARIO, n. 4, at 88; UN Secretary-General, ‘Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, UN Doc. A/51/389 (1996), paras. 7-8; Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of 
Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 153. 
35 Al-Jedda, n. 28, para. 68; M. Simons, ‘Dutch Peacekeepers Are Found Responsible for Deaths’, New York Times, 
7 September 2013, at A3. The UN has indicated that its acceptance of exclusive responsibility is driven in part by 
‘political’ considerations. ARIO, n. 4, at 88. 
36  For a recent example, see Mothers of Srebrenica v. the Netherlands and the United Nations, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW1999 (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 April 2012), upheld in Stichting Mothers of 
Srebrenica and others v. the Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12 (ECtHR, 11 June 2013), paras. 135-70.  
37 The UN’s ‘acceptance’ of responsibility is invariably combined with a universal assertion of immunity and the 
diversion of claims to a woefully inadequate internal claims system. Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of 
Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 121-9. Recently, see R. Roshan Lall and E. 
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instead need to identify operational control as the relevant superior feature in a respondeat 
superior narrative.38 
A third category of frameworks, yet to find judicial affirmation, would expand attribution to a 
broader subset. The more conservative version would attribute JPE conduct to both those with 
operational or authorial control and any entity that supplied the individual perpetrators of the 
wrong. 39 A more expansive version would attribute wrongful JPE conduct to all enterprise 
participants, irrespective of venture control or connection to the individual perpetrators.40 The 
rationale for such automatic joint attribution is that it maximally protects victim compensation 
and ensures robust deterrence. 
Ultimately, the authorial control, operational control, and blanket joint attribution tests all focus 
on general enterprise structure, rather than the specifics of the wrongful conduct.41 This is a 
mistake. What makes JPEs unique among public ventures is that they disaggregate the 
concentrated power that a state ordinarily holds over its organs and agents, distributing the levers 
of command, authority, and control in various ways depending on the negotiated compromise 
underpinning the particular enterprise. The result is that the influence of any given state or 
international organisation over conduct varies significantly depending not just on that 
participant’s position in the enterprise, but also on the nature of the impugned conduct. For JPEs, 
a contextual, conduct-specific standard of attribution is more likely to pair legal attribution with 
moral responsibility and optimal incentives. 
This is the appeal of the ‘effective control’ standard adopted by the ILC and several courts in the 
context of one particular form of JPE: the placement of multiple states’ and international 
Pilkington, ‘UN Will Not Compensate Haiti Cholera Victims, Ban Ki-moon Tells President’, The Guardian, 21 
February 2013. 
38 Section 6 rebuts such a rationale. 
39 J.J. Paust, ‘The U.N. Is Bound By Human Rights’ (2010) 51 Harv ILJO 1, at 8. 
40 This standard was asserted unsuccessfully on behalf of Saddam Hussein against twenty-one members of the US-
led coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003. Saddam Hussein v. Albania and others, Declaration on Admissibility, App. 
No. 23276/04 (ECtHR, 14 March 2006). Something like this view is also hinted at in Human Rights Watch’s work 
on Frontex operations in Greece. Mann, The EU’s Dirty Hands, n. 7, at 46-52. Although stopping short of a legal 
claim that wrongful detainee transfers by Frontex are attributable to all contributors to the mission, it does insist that 
all contributing states withdraw. Ibid., at 52, 55. 
41 There are marginal exceptions. See sources and discussion at n. 32, above, on ‘cutting across’ the chain of 
command. 
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organisations’ organs at the disposal of an international organisation.42 There are at least two 
relevant interpretations of ‘effective control’, so this divides into two alternative standards. 
This Chapter deepens the normative foundations of the ‘preventive control’ interpretation I have 
advocated elsewhere and extends it to all JPEs.43 The Hague Court of Appeal adopted a version 
of this standard in 2011 and was affirmed two years later by the Dutch Supreme Court.44 The 
preventive control framework is detailed in section 6, but four features warrant foregrounding. 
First, for any given wrong, it inquires of each enterprise participant whether that participant held 
the levers of control most relevant to preventing the type of wrongful conduct in question.45 
Second, those levers include not just the authority to direct, but also authority over training, 
discipline, hiring, promotion, criminal jurisdiction, and more. Third, which of these levers 
underpins responsibility depends on the type of wrongful conduct. Finally, preventive control can 
be shared. 
The dominant alternative interpretation of ‘effective control’ is that used by the ICJ in Nicaragua 
and later judgments to evaluate state responsibility for the wrongs of non-state armed groups.46 
42 Article 7 ARIO, n. 4; ARIO Commentary, n. 4, at 87. The ILC’s stricter test for organs placed at the disposal of a 
state asks whether the organ exercises ‘elements of the governmental authority’ of the borrowing state; the 
Commentary elaborates that the borrower must exercise exclusive direction and control to be attributed with organ 
conduct. ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 43-44. Endorsing effective control, see: Hasan 1XKDQRYLü Y. the 
Netherlands, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR0133 (Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage, 5 July 2011) (1XKDQRYLü Court of 
Appeal); also ILDC 1742 (NL 2011). Upheld in: The Netherlands v. Hasan 1XKDQRYLü, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 6 September 2013) (1XKDQRYLü Supreme Court); R (on the Application of Al-
Jedda) (FC) v. Sec’y of State for Def. [2007] UKHL 58, upheld in: Al-Jedda, n. 28, paras. 80, 84. 
43 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 
157. The ILC has termed mine a ‘wide meaning’ of effective control. ARIO, n. 4, at 93, fn. 129. It is, I think, the 
optimal interpretation of Article 7 ARIO, n. 4 (Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the 
Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct’, n. 3, at 721), but that doctrinal debate is tangential here, since not all JPEs are 
covered by Article 7. 
44 1XKDQRYLü Court of Appeal, n. 42. In affirming the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of effective control without 
caveat, the Supreme Court did not follow its Procurator General. 1XKDQRYLü Supreme Court, n. 42, paras. 3.11.2-3, 
3.12.2-3. The latter had advised upholding the lower judgment, but using a narrower interpretation of effective 
control. P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘Procurator General of the Dutch Supreme Court Concludes to Reject Appeal against 
Srebrenica Judgment’, SHARES Blog, 3 May, 2013. Drawing the connection to my proposal, see ARIO, n. 4, at 93, 
fn. 129; Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct’, n. 3, 
at 719-27.  
45 1XKDQRYLü Court of Appeal, n. 42, paras. 5.8-5.9; Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control 
into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 157; Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and 
the Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct’, n. 3, at 721. 
46 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para. 115 (Nicaragua); Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, paras. 397-401; Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Report 2005, 168, paras. 146-
147 (Armed Activities). 
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Adapted to JPEs, this would attribute enterprise conduct to the state or organisation that ‘directed 
or enforced the perpetration of [the wrongful] acts.’47 When the conduct is directed by one of the 
state or international organisation enterprise participants, this test is attractive. But it breaks down 
in the common case that the wrong occurs in the absence of such directions, or even in 
contravention thereof.48 
It would be implausible to attribute such wrongful conduct straightforwardly to a state or 
international organisation when performed by one of its organs acting alone (as is uncontroversial 
legal orthodoxy), and yet to leave precisely the same wrongful conduct of an otherwise identical 
JPE organ completely unattributed to any legal person merely because the organ is the 
collaborative product of a number of states and organisations. 49  Filling that implausible 
attribution gap would mean supplementing the Nicaragua test with a presumptive rule of 
attribution to a particular participant for enterprise conduct not occurring pursuant to state or 
international organisation direction. Such a presumption has mixed doctrinal credentials, but the 
more important point here is that it sacrifices the value of a conduct-specific test. 50  Any 
confluence between the presumption and actual institutional influence over the conduct in any 
given case would be serendipitous. 
47 Nicaragua, ibid., para. 115. See also Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, paras. 397, 400; Armed Activities, ibid., para. 146. 
Along these lines, some have suggested the test for military JPEs should be: ‘who is giving the orders – the [troop 
contributing] State or the [authorial] organization?’ M. Milanoviü and T. Papiü, ‘As Bad as it Gets: the European 
Court of Human Rights's Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 267, at 
282.  
48 P. Rowe, ‘United Nations Peacekeepers and Human Rights Violations’ (2010) 51 Harv ILJ 69, at 76 (most 
peacekeeping wrongs contravene superior orders). 
49 Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct’, n. 3, at 
722; Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 
158-9. Such non-attribution of JPE conduct would contradict the ILC framework. ARIO, n. 4, at 88, 95. It is, of 
course, the typical result of applying the Nicaragua test to non-state armed groups. Nicaragua, n. 46, para. 116; 
Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, paras. 413-5; Armed Activities, n. 46, para. 160.  
50 Under Article 7 ARIO, n. 4, the seconded organ’s conduct is attributed to the receiving international organisation 
‘if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct’ (emphasis added). Since Article 6 ARIO, n. 4 and 
Article 4 ARSIWA, n. 2 hold that a state’s or international organisation’s organs’ conduct is attributable to that state 
or organisation, one might argue that if the receiving international organisation lacks effective control, the conduct 
would be attributed automatically to the lender. The Dutch Procurator General and the ECtHR have hinted at this, 
but both equivocate by emphasising the control of the respective lending states. Nollkaemper, ‘Procurator General of 
the Dutch Supreme Court Concludes to Reject Appeal against Srebrenica Judgment’, n. 44; Al-Jedda, n. 28, paras. 
80-86. It is difficult to reconcile such a presumption with the ECtHR’s endorsement of dual attribution (ibid., para. 
80) or the ILC’s Commentaries. Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to Prevent 
Unlawful Conduct’, n. 3, at 720-1. Further confusing the doctrinal space, other authorities have suggested the 
opposite presumption (that conduct ultra vires is attributable to the receiving international organisations, not the 
contributor). ARIO, n. 4, at 96; 1XKDQRYLü District Court, n. 32, paras. 4.8-4.15; Behrami, n. 28, paras. 133-35. 
Problematically, that presumption would render Article 7 ARIO, n. 4 redundant. 
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The preventive control approach is alone among JPE attribution frameworks in tracking 
institutional influence in all contexts. In doing this, it instantiates legally the deeper normative 
reciprocity between public power and preventive responsibility that underpins various more 
mature rules of international responsibility – most obviously, those on preventive due diligence. 
 
4. Vigilant prevention of wrongdoing in international law 
The principle that states have a duty to act vigilantly to prevent wrongdoing within their spheres 
of power is central to international law’s approach to ensuring global values. In its early guise, 
this doctrine of preventive due diligence developed in a context of bilateral state relations, and it 
remains significant in certain bilateral realms. 51  But even in that form it has always been 
premised on the notion that claiming sovereign authority entails a fundamental duty to use that 
power in a way that protects those most vulnerable to wrongdoing within its sphere. That idea 
provided the foundation for legal frameworks governing: first, neutrality, in which the state must 
prevent private actors within its jurisdiction from using force transnationally;52 second, states’ 
obligations vis-à-vis one another’s citizens, in which the state has a duty to prevent harm to 
foreign nationals,53 foreign investors,54 and diplomatic and consular premises and officials55 in its 
territory; and third, non-violent transboundary harm, in which states must prevent private entities 
from polluting neighbouring states.56 
In line with international law’s (partial) transition from a regime focused on bilateral inter-state 
51 Barcelona Traction, n. 21, paras. 33-35, 88. 
52 Caroline Incident: Webster’s letter to Fox (24 April 1841); Alabama claims of the United States of America 
against Great Britain, Award, (1872) 29 RIAA 125. 
53 British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (Great Britain/ Spain), Award, (1924) 2 RIAA 615; Janes et al. 
(United States of America v. United Mexican States), Award, (1926) 4 RIAA 82; Youmans (United States of America 
v. United Mexican States), Award, (1926) 4 RIAA 110; Massey (United States of America v. United Mexican States), 
Award, (1927) 4 RIAA 155.  
54 This remains a bilateral frame. For example: Asian Agricultural Products (AAPL) Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, 
Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 (1990); Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/11 (2005), para. 164; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ 
Report 1989, 15.  
55 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1980, 3, paras. 63-68. 
56 Trail Smelter (United States of America v. Canada), Award, (1938) 3 RIAA 1905. On Trail Smelter controversies, 
see R.M. Bratspies and R.A. Miller (eds.), Transboundary Harm in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); 
Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm’, n. 19, at 29.  
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relations to a regime of global public normativity, preventive vigilance is now central to the legal 
frameworks for quelling global terrorism, upholding human rights, protecting the global 
environment, and combating mass atrocity. At the normative crux of these regimes is the 
reciprocity between the state’s claim to legitimate power and its duty to prevent wrongs of global 
concern.  
The contours of the state’s preventive responsibility regarding transnational armed groups are the 
subject of heated debate, but few would deny the central legal importance of such a duty.57 The 
ICJ offered the most modest (and heavily criticised) articulation of the standard when it held that 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – a profoundly weak state lacking control over the 
relevant territory – was for those reasons excused from engaging in significant preventive 
action.58 More expansively, others point to Security Council support, near-universal acceptance, 
and extensive participation in the American response to Al-Qaeda’s 2001 attacks, which involved 
waging war on Afghanistan on the grounds that it had ‘harboured’ Al-Qaeda.59 This stimulated 
an ongoing debate as to whether the state’s duty to act vigilantly to prevent actors on its territory 
from launching transnational attacks might be transforming into a rule whereby preventive failure 
could underpin attribution with the attack (and thus trigger the attributed state’s vulnerability to 
lawful defensive force).60 This remains a minority view, but regardless of ongoing disagreements 
as to the appropriate trigger for lawful defensive force, the basic preventive duty is clear.61 It has 
been strengthened and operationalised over the past 15 years in a series of Security Council 
resolutions.62 
57 The ICJ has affirmed the customary international law status of the prohibition on states acquiescing in others’ 
transnational uses of force from their territory. Declaration on Friendly Relations, UN Doc. A/RES/2625, UN Doc. 
A/8028 (24 October 1970) at 123; Definition of Aggression, UN Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974) 
Article 3(f); Armed Activities, n. 46, paras. 162, 300. 
58 Ibid., paras. 301-304. But see ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 82; and Separate Opinion of 
Judge Tomka, paras. 1-6. 
59 T. Becker, Terrorism and the State (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 218; D. Jinks, ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of 
Private Armed Groups’ (2003) 4 Chic JIL 83, at 89.; V.-J. Proulx, ‘Babysitting Terrorists’ (2005) 23 Berk JIL 615, at 
637-38. 
60 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence, 5th edn. (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 261; T. Franck, Recourse to 
Force (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 54; G. Travalio and J. Altenburg, ‘Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of 
Military Force’ (2003) 4 Chic JIL 97, at 100-111; Proulx, ibid., at 637; Jinks, ibid., at 89-90. Some states have used 
the US model to assert broad claims. T. Ruys, ‘Quo Vadit Jus ad Bellum?’ (2008) 9 MJIL 334, at 354-56. 
61 C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 135 (on the controversial 
nature of liability to defensive force post-Afghanistan). 
62 Prior to 11 September 2001, see for example UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999). Following the attacks, the 
Council issued a slew of resolutions elaborating states’ preventive duties. Most immediately: UN Doc. S/RES/1373 
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Duties of preventive vigilance have also taken on a public dimension in environmental law.63 
Moving beyond bilateral harm, the ICJ has recognised the state’s obligation to ensure that private 
actors under its jurisdiction respect the global environment,64 emphasising the stakes for ‘the 
whole of mankind’. 65  Upholding this preventive legal obligation is considered a core 
governmental duty.66  
Perhaps most notable, however, has been the rise of preventive duties in human rights law. Many 
human rights treaties lack explicit provisions obligating the state to use its sovereign power 
affirmatively to prevent human rights violations by private actors.67 It was not until the 1980s 
that the preventive dimension of human rights obligations under these treaties came to the fore.68 
In an early and influential statement of this responsibility, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights held that states must organise ‘all the structures through which public power is exercised, 
so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights. 
[They] must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the 
Convention.’ 69  This basic preventive responsibility has now been endorsed and affirmed 
repeatedly across human rights regimes.70  
(28 September 2001). These resolutions continue, see UN Doc. S/RES/2083 (17 December 2012).  
63 Framework Convention on Climate Change, n. 23, Articles 3-6; Rio Declaration, n. 14, Principles 2, 11, 16; 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in ILC Report on the work of its fifty-
third session, UN Doc. A/56/10 Supp. No. 10 (2001), at 370, 372 (Article 3), 393, 395, 411; Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 14, paras. 101, 187, 197, 204, 223, 265; LOSC, n. 
14, Articles 192-194, 196, 199, 207-212; Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities 
with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Case No. 17, (2011) 50 ILM 458, paras. 99-120; ILA, Berlin Conference: Water 
Resources Law (2004) Articles 2, 5- 8, 11, 12, 16, 22- 27, 32-35 and Commentaries. 
64 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report 1996, 226, para. 29 (Nuclear 
Weapons); *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros, n. 14, para. 53. See also Rio Declaration, n. 14, Principle 2. 
65 *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros, n. 14, paras. 53, 140. See also Nuclear Weapons, ibid., at 505-07 (Judge Weeramantry, 
dissenting). 
66 Vicuña, Responsibility and Liability Under International Law for Environmental Damage, n. 23, Article 3; P. 
Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and The Environment, 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 112. See also ITLOS 
Advisory Opinion 2011, n. 63, para. 112; Dellapenna, ‘A Climate of Disruption’, n. 13, at 86. 
67 V.P. Tzevelekos, ‘In Search of Alternative Solutions’ (2010) 35 Brook JIL 155, at 182.  
68 See H. Shue, Basic Rights, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 52; A. Eide, Report on the Right 
to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (7 July 1987), at 34-36, 112-15, 167-81.  
69 Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, IACtHR, (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), para. 166. 
70 A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2004); Delgado Páez v. Colombia, Communication No. 195/1985, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1992), paras. 2, 10, 13; HRC, General Comment 31, n. 23, paras. 6, 8; Committee Against 
Torture, General Comment 2, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2007), paras. 18-24; Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
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The strength of the reciprocal link between the state’s claim to legitimate power and the duty to 
exercise that power preventively is spotlighted in its extraterritorial application. Non-refoulement 
prohibits the state from transferring individuals under its control to a state where they would be at 
risk of severe abuse (even when the former state’s agents are holding the persons on the territory 
of the latter).71 States have been found to have a duty to prevent rights violations by private 
persons acting in foreign territories over which they exercise effective control,72 and by private 
persons over whom they have preventive influence.73 This latter doctrine may prove especially 
important in regulating multinational corporations. 74 Overall, the extraterritoriality of human 
rights illustrates the tight link between the scope of the state’s preventive responsibilities and the 
scope of its asserted power, a point sharpened by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)’s holding that human rights obligations abroad can be ‘divided and tailored’ to reflect 
the nature of the state’s control.75 
These developments in human rights have become intertwined with the preventive dimension of 
the laws of war.76 Building on belligerent occupiers’ duty to restore public order,77 the ICJ found 
Uganda responsible for failing to act vigilantly to prevent ‘rebel groups acting on their own 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (16 December 2005), para. 3; O. De Schutter 
et al., ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34 HRQ 1084, at 1134; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 12, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), para. 15; MFHR v. Greece, European Committee of Social 
Rights, Complaint No. 30/2005 (2006), para. 192; SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001), paras. 46, 58, 61, 63, 65-66. But see M. Hakimi, ‘State Bystander 
Responsibility’ (2010) 21 EJIL 341, at 367-371 (limiting the duty to a narrow category of abuses). 
71 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010). 
72 HRC, General Comment 31, n. 23, para. 10; Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89 (ECtHR, 23 March 1995), 
paras. 62-64. Conversely, even when a state lacks control over part of its territory, it retains ‘a duty to take all the 
appropriate [preventive] measures which it is still within its power to take.’ ,ODúFX, n. 13, para. 313.  
73  The ECtHR required Russia to use its ‘dissuasive influence’ [later described as ‘decisive’] to prevent the 
breakaway Transdniestrian regime in Moldova from violating rights. ,ODúcu, n. 13, para. 387. See also De Schutter, 
‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’, n. 70, at 1136-7. 
74 J. Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) Annex, Part I; De 
Schutter, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, n. 70, Article 25(c), at 1135-6, 1139-45; Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (2011), para. 5; Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Concluding Observations, UN Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007), para. 17; Tzevelekos, ‘In Search 
of Alternative Solutions’, n. 67. 
75 Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011), para. 137. 
76 Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, n. 70, para. 3. 
77 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, in force 26 January 1910, 1 Bevans 631, Article 
43. 
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account’ from violating human rights and humanitarian law in the Eastern DRC.78 The Inter-
American Court has interpreted Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 to impose a similar 
duty on states with respect to the violations of non-state actors in internal armed conflicts.79 
Perhaps the most explicit articulation of the deep normative reciprocity discussed throughout this 
section is the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P).80 Still searching for a clear legal status, R2P is 
currently a complex cluster of lex lata and lex ferenda.81 It is, in my view, best understood as an 
expression of the normative foundation of an evolving legal regime – the blueprint for the 
legitimation of sovereign power under a humanised international law. It transforms sovereignty 
from a shield into a bundle of powers justified because they enable the prevention wrongs of 
global concern.82 Seen in this light, R2P captures the moral reciprocity between public power and 
responsibility – a foundational principle that makes normative sense of the rise of the range of 
preventive duties described above.  
Indeed, one can read R2P as holding state power contingent on its preventive use. A state that 
fails to protect its people from atrocity loses temporarily the basic sovereign right not to be 
subject to forceful external intervention, with preventive responsibility extending to the 
international community.83 Precisely what this means is hotly disputed, but the latter duty is 
widely thought to apply at least to the UN Security Council – notably, the body with the most 
expansive claims to legitimate global public power – and it has been suggested that the 
permanent members bear a special obligation not to obstruct such action.84 Here, too, the basic 
moral reciprocity is apparent. 
78 Armed Activities, n. 46, paras. 178-80, 219-229, 248-250. 
79 The Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, IACtHR, (Ser. C) No. 134 (2005), para. 114. 
80 ICISS Report, n. 6; UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (2006), para. 4; 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 
(2005), UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (2005), para. 138; UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN 
Doc. A/63/677 (2009), at 8-9. 
81 The Libya intervention of 2011 bolstered R2P’s legal status. UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011), preamble. Discussing 
R2P’s mixed legal credentials, see C. Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (2007) 101 AJIL 99. On R2P and existing 
law, see M. Hakimi, ‘Distributing the Responsibility to Protect’, in P.A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs (eds.), this 
volume, at___.  
82 ICISS Report, n. 6, paras. 1.35, 2.14-2.15, 2.30-2.32; High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, & Changes, A 
More Secure World, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), paras. 29-30; Stahn, ibid., at 118.  
83 ICISS Report, n. 6, para. 2.25; L. Feinstein and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’ (2004) Foreign Affairs 
(describing R2P as ‘nothing less than the redefinition of sovereignty itself’). 
84 ICISS Report, n. 6, ch. 6, especially para. 6.21. A. Peters, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Permanent Five – 
The Obligation to Give Reasons for a Veto’, in J. Hoffmann and P.A. Nollkaemper (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: 
From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 199. 
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In a final case illustrating the doctrinal reach of that underlying principle, the ICJ held the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) responsible under the Genocide Convention85 for failing to make 
‘the best efforts within [its] power to try and prevent’ Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS) [Bosnian 
Serb Army] atrocities in Bosnia.86 Responsibility hinged on the FRY’s ‘capacity to influence 
effectively’ the génocidaires’ actions (whether or not it could have stopped the genocide).87 
Notwithstanding caveats emphasising the FRY’s special links to the VRS and the former’s failure 
to abide by a provisional measures ruling, the judgment adds to the broad trend towards 
recognising in law the normative reciprocity between public power and the responsibility to use it 
to prevent wrongdoing of global concern.88  
Four features of this trend warrant emphasis. First, the ex ante duty to prevent such wrongdoing 
is not reflected in a strict responsibility ex post – if the state acts with vigilance, it is not 
responsible for wrongs it was unable to prevent.89 Second, even if the state fails to act with 
vigilance, it is not attributed with the ensuing wrongs; its violation is the separate delict of failing 
to prevent. 
Third, however, in the areas of greatest global public concern, the line between attribution and 
preventive failure is blurring. Some now argue that states that fail to prevent private human rights 
abuses or transnational uses of force should be held responsible ex post for the underlying wrong 
(not just preventive failure) and judicial decisions are occasionally ambiguous on this issue.90 
Moreover, any technical distinction is anyway of reduced significance if the consequences are the 
same (such as if failing to prevent transnational terrorism makes a state liable to defensive force). 
Fourth, and most significantly, the doctrine of preventive vigilance is a trans-substantive 
principle (arguably, a general principle) by which lines of responsibility are drawn between states 
85 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 9 December 1948, in force 12 
January 1951, 78 UNTS 277. 
86 Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, para. 438. 
87 Ibid., paras. 430, 434, 462. 
88 For the caveats, see ibid., paras. 429, 430, 435.  
89 P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification’ (1999) 10 EJIL 371, at 379. See Corfu Channel, n. 13,at 
18-22; Armed Activities, n. 46, para. 300; Velásquez-Rodriguez, n. 69, paras. 172-75; Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, para. 
430; Faure and Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate 
Change’, n. 13, at 145-146; Birnie and Boyle, International Law and The Environment, n. 66, at 112.  
90 On transnational force, see sources and discussion at n. 59-60, above; on human rights, see sources and discussion 
at n. 110, 113-115, above. Occasionally, courts blur the line. El-Masri, n. 17, para. 206; Velásquez-Rodriguez, n. 69, 
para. 177; Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001), paras. 76-77. 
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and fundamental wrongs.91 Although what counts as the diligence due is highly contextual, there 
is a consistent normative core: states have a duty to act vigilantly and reasonably within their 
sphere of lawful influence to prevent wrongdoing of global concern. The separation of delicts is 
misleading in this respect. There is no due diligence violation unless the wrong itself occurs; the 
ex ante vigilance obligation is only a ground for ex post responsibility vis-à-vis the core global 
wrong. A state that fails to act with vigilance will not be responsible ex post if the core wrong 
does not occur. Preventive due diligence is thus functionally far closer to attribution than the 
delictual distinction allows. The global wrong is the same; the difference is in the route by which 
the state is connected to it.92  
This is important. On the prevailing legal account, rules of preventive vigilance and rules of 
attribution are classified as primary and secondary rules, respectively.93 Critics have noted that 
purportedly secondary rules of international law often import or create primary obligations.94 But 
the reverse point is no less powerful: as a trans-substantive method of drawing a line of 
responsibility between the state and an underlying primary wrong, preventive due diligence 
shares key features with secondary rules on attribution.95 Both define the connective link between 
state and wrongdoing.  
This functional commonality, explored in the next section, is crucial, because underpinning the 
connective analysis in both contexts (due diligence and attribution) is a deeper normative 
commonality. Namely, the moral reciprocity between the state’s claim to (and exercise of) public 
power, and its duty to use that power to prevent wrongdoing of global concern.96 The normative 
resonance of that principle in both of these contexts, and across substantive domains sets the 
stage for starting with that reciprocity in assessing responsibility for JPE wrongdoing. 
91 Tzevelekos, ‘In Search of Alternative Solutions’, n. 67, at 160; De Schutter, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, n. 70, at 
1135-6; Corfu Channel, n. 13, at 22; Trail Smelter, n. 56; L. Condorelli, ‘The Imputability to States of Acts of 
International Terrorism’ (1989) 19 Isr YHR 233, at 240. See also Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’, n. 70, at 
345. But see Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, para. 429. 
92 For example: Velásquez-Rodriguez, n. 69, para. 172: ‘a private ‘act which violates human rights (…) can lead to 
international responsibility of the State (…) because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation’. 
93 ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 31, 38-9. 
94 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law’, n. 2, at 408-12. 
95 Defending the infusion of primary rules in its rules on complicity, the ILC emphasises complicity’s ‘derivative’ 
nature. ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 65. However, the duty of preventive vigilance is no less derivative of the 
underlying wrong.  
96 Armed Activities, n. 46, Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, para. 2. 
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5. Due diligence, attribution, and drawing lines of responsibility  
At the crux of the functional similarity between preventive vigilance and attribution is the fact 
that state responsibility is always at least minimally vicarious.97 This is not to deny the moral 
reality of state responsibility – states and international organisations have morally significant 
agential features that warrant holding them (and not only their members or agents) responsible 
for official conduct.98 However, because state action just is some combination of human acts 
(albeit acts defined and enabled by their institutional context), state responsibility necessarily 
involves drawing a normative link between the state and the conduct of natural persons.99 And on 
prevailing moral and legal understandings, this connection is not merely one of direct causation, 
whereby human agents carry out institutionally defined obligations. State organs and their 
constituent individuals take initiative; they act beyond, and sometimes contrary to, what is 
institutionally required. But as long as they engage in ‘official’ conduct, the dominant view 
attributes their acts to the state.100  
The line of responsibility connecting the state to such conduct is not obvious. Indeed, 
emphasising the distinction between the perpetrators and the state, and thus the need for a 
normative account of the latter’s responsibility, one way in which a legally responsible state may 
be required to repair victims is by punishing the perpetrators.101  
Making sense of the state’s ex post responsibility for the conduct of agents acting on initiative or 
even contrary to instructions requires a moral narrative that connects the behaviour of the agent to 
the failures of the state institution. Much like the contexts described in section 4, that narrative is 
a story of preventive responsibility reciprocally entailed by claiming or holding public power. 
The functional congruity of vigilance and attribution analyses in this context is plain from the 
structure of judicial examinations of wrongdoing of global public concern. When such a wrong is 
97 Notably, the ILC’s work state responsibility began with the protection of aliens. United Nations, The Work of the 
International Law Commission, 4th edn. (1988) at 91. Compare sources cited at n. 53, above. See also C. Chinkin, ‘A 
Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’ (1999) 10 EJIL 387, at 395.  
98 On the moral responsibility of organisations (simultaneous or not with that of individual members), see P. Pettit, 
‘Responsibility Incorporated’ (2007) 117 Ethics 171. See also P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘Systemic Effects of International 
Responsibility for International Crimes’ (2010) 8 SCJIL 313 (on the state organisational system’s role in 
international crimes). 
99 ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 35. 
100 Article 7, ARSIWA, n. 2; Article 8 ARIO, n. 4.  
101 ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 106. 
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not directed or authorised by the relevant state authorities, the judicial evaluation of ex post 
responsibility involves considering potential normative connections between the state and the 
wrongful conduct, including both direct attribution and a failure of preventive vigilance, often 
considered in turn.102  
The normative congruity of the two forms of linking is most obvious in the case of an organ 
acting ultra vires.103 The state holds – or has the capacity to hold – significant levers of control 
over its organs. It is the combination of that heightened preventive capacity with the importance 
of restraining those who wield public power that drives the moral narrative underpinning a strict 
institutional duty to prevent ultra vires wrongdoing by state officials.104 Giving voice to this 
narrative, the ECtHR held in ,ODúFX that state authorities ‘are under a duty to impose their will [on 
their subordinates] and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected.’105 
In this scenario and that of a failure of preventive vigilance, the underlying wrong is motivated by 
the will and initiative of a natural person. In both cases, the moral basis of the state’s 
responsibility with respect to that wrong is in its failure to prevent the wrongful conduct.106 
Emphasising precisely this parallel, a former UN Special Rapporteur observes, ‘[i]n addition to 
preventing violations committed by state agents, human rights law obligates states to use due 
diligence to prevent harm (…) caused by armed individuals and groups.’107 The common moral 
narrative is one of the reciprocity between public power and prevention. As discussed below, the 
different legal applications of that concept are explained not by a deviation from the reciprocity 
principle, but by different regulatory dangers in the two contexts.  
102 See, for example, Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, para. 379; Consular Staff in Tehran, n. 55, paras. 58, 61; ,ODúFX, n. 13, 
para. 313; Velásquez-Rodriguez, n. 69, paras. 165-7. 
103 Although considering it a misuse of the technical term, Ago acknowledges that both state responsibility arising 
from private wrongs and state responsibility for public organs acting ultra vires have been termed ‘indirect’ or 
‘vicarious’ responsibility. Eighth report on state responsibility by Special Rapporteur R. Ago, ILC Yearbook 
1979/II(1), at 4. See also R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn. (Harlow: 
Longman, 1992), at 500-02. 
104 Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’, n. 70, at 356; D.D. Caron, ‘The Basis of Responsibility’, in R.B. Lillich 
and D.B. Magraw (eds.), The Iran-US Claims Tribunal (Ardsley: Transnational, 1998), at 109, 138; M.N. Shaw, 
International Law, 5th edn. (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 700; B.A. Frey, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Tools 
Used to Violate Human Rights’ (2004) 3 Disarmament F. 37, at 40.  
105 ,ODúFX, n. 13, para. 319. See also Youmans, n. 53, para. 14; Velásquez-Rodriguez, n. 69, para. 171. 
106 Compare the ,ODúFX attribution principle to the due diligence principle articulated in Armed Activities. Armed 
Activities, n. 46, para. 246: ‘Uganda violated its duty of vigilance by not taking adequate measures to ensure that its 
military forces did not’ loot and plunder’ (emphasis added). See also Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public/Private 
Dimension’, n. 97, at 395.  
107 Frey, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons’, n. 104, at 41 (emphasis added). 
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An alternative to the reciprocity narrative might emphasise that state organs act on behalf of the 
state in a way that the private natural persons under its jurisdiction do not.108 They represent it, 
and act in furtherance of its projects, and this representative function might be thought to 
underpin the attribution of their conduct. The problem with this is that, in acting ultra vires, state 
organs diverge from the state’s projects and often fail to advance its interests. Moreover, de facto 
organs – which are subject to the same attribution rules – do not ‘represent’ the state at all; their 
connection to the state is defined solely by their subjection to its control.109 These contours of 
ultra vires attribution are explained better by a moral account rooted in the state’s obligation to 
prevent global wrongful conduct as a reciprocal entailment of its claimed or asserted public 
power than they are by one focused on the idea of organs acting on behalf of states.  
Of course, if this is true, one might ask why the legal operationalisation of that basic normative 
principle differs meaningfully in the preventive vigilance and attribution contexts. The state is 
strictly responsible for the ultra vires wrongs of its organs, but only responsible under a due 
diligence standard for the wrongs of private persons acting within the scope of its claimed or 
exercised public power. If the prevention of such wrongs is part of what it means to exercise 
public power legitimately, why should the same test of responsibility not apply in both cases?  
This question is at the heart of long-running criticisms of the public/private divide in international 
law.110 And that is telling. The divergent operationalisation of preventive reciprocity reflects the 
ideas that some functions are quintessentially public in character,111 and that the state must ensure 
without fail that these functions (but not private actions) are exercised lawfully.112 It is, in other 
words, rooted in the public/private distinction. 
108 It is important to note that there are contexts in which principles other than control and the reciprocity principle 
underpin attribution. Article 9 ARSIWA, n. 2; ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 43; Caron, ‘The Basis of 
Responsibility’, n. 104, at 128. 
109 Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, paras. 391-392. 
110 H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (Huntington: Juris, 2000), at 59-61; 
Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’, n. 97, at 395. 
111 ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 39-49. 
112 If the state contracts such functions to private actors, it does so at its own normative risk. Human Rights 
Committee, Communication No. 273/1989, UN Doc. A/44/40 (1989); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment 19, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (2008), para. 46. Courts in Israel and India have found 
unconstitutional the contracting of prisons and special police, respectively. Academic Center of Law and Business, 
Human Rights Division and others v. Minister of Finance and others, HCJ 2605/05 (2009); Nandini Sundar and 
others v. State of Chattisgarh and Union Government, Supreme Court of India, (2011). See also ARSIWA 
Commentary, n. 2, at 38; R. Higgins, Problems and Process (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 153. 
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Critics of that distinction variously emphasise four things. First, dissensus as to which functions 
are quintessentially public and significant variance in the functions actually allocated to public 
entities.113 Second, the fact that a disproportionate number of the human rights violations suffered 
by women occur in the ‘private’ sphere, whereas a disproportionate number of those suffered by 
men occur in the ‘public’ sphere.114 Third, the relative invisibility of multinational corporations 
in an international legal regime focused on public actors.115 And, finally, the lack of a meaningful 
normative distinction between terrorists and the states that ‘harbour’ them.116 Overall, the worry 
is that the public/private divide allows for wrongs that ought to be concerns of the international 
community to be sheltered from international law.117 
The preventive vigilance obligations described in section 4 offer a way to accommodate that 
concern without eliminating the public/private distinction. They allow international law to 
respond to violence against women, the wrongdoing of multinational corporations, and 
transnational terrorism.118 They narrow the public/private divide so as to mitigate its pathologies. 
However, although this narrowing is a virtue, the public/private distinction remains normatively 
significant, particularly in operationalising the principle of preventive reciprocity. 
First, the state’s preventive control over the ultra vires acts of its organs vastly exceeds its 
preventive control over the acts of private individuals within its jurisdiction. It is through state 
processes that individuals are selected to be entrusted with public power, through state systems 
that they are trained and prepared for it, and under state supervision, in the context of a state 
organisation, subject to state discipline, and under state organisational rules that they exercise it. 
This warrants different expectations regarding the state’s capacity to control the respective 
113 H. Charlesworth et al., ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 AJIL 613, at 626; Chinkin, ‘A 
Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’, n. 97, at 388. 
114 Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, ibid.; UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (1996), paras. 26-31. 
115 See discussion and sources at n. 122, below. 
116 See discussion and sources at n. 59-61, above. 
117 Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’, n. 97. 
118 On multinational corporations, see discussion and sources at n. 122, below. On counter-terrorism, see discussion 
and sources at n. 57-62, above. On violence against women, see, for example, Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19, in UN Doc. A/47/38 (1992), para. 9; Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, Belém do Pará, 9 June 
1994, in force 5 March 1995, Article 7; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Comm. 
No. 2/2003, AT v. Hungary, in UN Doc. A/60/38 (Part I) Annex III (2005), paras. 9.2-9.6; Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 
33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 June 2009), paras. 146-149, 191; Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No. 210.  
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actors’ conduct.119  
Second, when state organs and agents engage in wrongs of global public concern, they wield 
great power over human victims.120 Endowed with the coercive force of a public authority, the 
public actor has a significantly greater opportunity than does her private analogue to inflict such 
wrongs on those who lack the equivalent means to defend themselves. Indeed, in many cases, the 
public perpetrator would be the very actor to whom such potential victims would most plausibly 
turn for protection when faced with an analogous private threat.121 This undermining of self- and 
other-help in response makes it especially important that abuses of public power be prevented by 
the state.122 
Third, and perhaps most important, is the different nature of the state’s preventive control over 
public and private actors. The most potent mechanisms through which states can prevent private 
actors from inflicting wrongs of global concern involve using the tools of law enforcement and 
national security.123 Holding the state strictly responsible for the wrongs of private actors within 
its jurisdictional sphere would demand implicitly the zealous use of these tools.124 Given the 
tendency for the zealous use of these tools to violate human rights, a strict responsibility to 
eliminate threats from private actors would itself threaten the very global human values 
motivating the preventive duty, and unfairly condemn states that seek to strike an optimal balance 
on precisely that dimension. 125  By holding states responsible only when they fail to enact 
119 See generally Restatement (Third) Of Agency section 2.04 (2006); P.S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of 
Torts (Oxford: Butterworths, 1967), at 15-18. Preventive duties intensify with control. Hakimi ‘State Bystander 
Responsibility’, n. 70, at 357-68; Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, IACtHR, (Ser. C) No. 99 (2003), para. 111. 
120 Individuals’ states may be the formal legal claimant on their behalf, but the violation is of global concern because 
of the profound harm to human beings. 
121 The typical public perpetrators of wrongs of global concern are in the security sector. 
122 Multinational corporations may also exercise great power over individuals, but this only emphasises why there is 
normative tension regarding their status under international law. Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, n. 74; C. Albin-Lackey, ‘Without Rules’ (Human Rights Watch, 2013); S. Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human 
Rights’, (2001) 111 YLJ 443. 
123 They are not the only tools; education is also crucial. 
124 Caron, ‘The Basis of Responsibility’, n. 104, at 127. 
125 Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, IACtHR, (Ser. C) No. 70 (2000), para. 174; Osman v. the United Kingdom, 
App. No. 23452/94, Case No. 87/1997/871/1083 (ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para. 116; J.A. Hessbruegge, ‘The 
Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law’ (2004) 36 NYUJILP 
265, at 276-77. Prior to the humanisation of international law, the dominant normative account of the public/private 
divide focused on sovereignty. British Claims in the Spanish Zone, n. 53.  
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reasonable preventive measures, the vigilance standard avoids upsetting that balance.126 
Preventing global wrongs by state organs or agents raises very different institutional concerns. 
The levers of preventive control held by the state over its organs are manifold. They do not 
depend on law enforcement, and they do not carry the danger of overzealous prevention inflicting 
new global harms. Moreover, given the heightened importance of protecting against the infliction 
of such harms by public authorities (due to potential victims’ vulnerability to those authorities 
and public authorities’ status as victims’ primary protective recourse), the imperative to exercise 
those preventive levers is especially acute. As a result, when the state fails to rein in violations by 
organs or agents, there is a sense of condemnation of the state itself, even if there is not specific 
evidence of institutional failure.127 
This reflects a presumption (typically vindicated) that when state organs engage in wrongs of 
global public concern, there must have been some institutional preventive failure at some level.128 
Of course, institutional imperfections and failures that could lead to wrongful conduct of global 
concern are common to all states. However, this does not lessen the sense that those states for 
which these failures do lead to such wrongdoing are properly condemned for it – a judgment 
rooted in an organisational analogue to moral luck.129  
In sum, the vulnerability of the potential victim, the degree of preventive power available to the 
state, the importance of prevention in the context of irreparable harm, and the lack of 
overwhelming global human values militating in the opposite direction – underpin the state’s 
strict ex post responsibility for the ultra vires wrongs of its organs. At the heart of that judgment 
is the assessment that preventing such wrongs is central to the sovereign legitimacy of the state 
and that this responsibility is especially pointed for those most tightly under its control. 
 
126 Vigilance is, in that sense, connected deeply to balancing in human rights adjudication. ,ODúFX, n. 13, para. 332.  
127 ,ODúFX, n. 13, para. 319 (the state ‘cannot shelter behind’ the ultra vires nature of the act); Al-Skeini, n. 75, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Bonello, para. 16. The language of responsibility here is the language of blame. L. 
Comiteau, ‘Court Says the Dutch are to Blame for Srebrenica Deaths’, Time, 6 July 2011. 
128 Vindication of this often comes in a retrospective inquiry into the institutional context of ultra vires wrongs. For 
example: Public Works and Government Services of Canada, Dishonoured Legacy (1997); Netherlands Institute for 
War Documentation, Srebrenica: A ‘Safe Area’ (2002). 
129 T. Nagel, ‘Moral Luck’, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979), at 24-38; B. Williams, ‘Moral Luck’, in 
Moral Luck (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), at 20-39. 
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6. Attribution and lawful joint public enterprises 
The reciprocity between claimed or asserted public power and preventive responsibility is no less 
important a foundational normative principle in the context of JPE wrongdoing than it is with 
respect to the unilateral contexts described above. And the considerations that affect how that 
principle is operationalised in unilateral contexts should also inform its legal operationalisation in 
the context of merged multilateral ventures. This leads to analysing JPE wrongdoing on two 
levels. The primary line of responsibility for such wrongs – elaborated in this section – should be 
one of strict attribution to at least one of the enterprise participants. Secondarily, as discussed in 
section 7, additional participants should be responsible for maintaining preventive vigilance. 
The case for attributing JPE wrongs to at least one participant state or international organisations 
rests on the same factors underpinning strict attribution in the unilateral context: the strength of 
potential preventive control, the robust imperative that it be maintained and exercised, the fact 
that JPEs wield public authority, and the reduced danger (relative to private wrongdoing) of 
overzealous enforcement. In determining the object of that attribution, the guiding principle, as 
identified in sections 4-5, must be the reciprocity between claimed or asserted public power and 
the responsibility to use it to prevent wrongdoing. In the context of a JPE, that means focusing on 
the distribution of levers of control relevant to prevention – a distribution that varies with 
enterprise structure and with the nature of the wrongful conduct.  
The exercise of public authority over human persons and the imperative that this power is not to 
be exercised abusively is no less significant for JPEs than it is for states acting unilaterally. Such 
enterprises, by definition, exercise public authority, and their constituent members wield public 
power with respect to those with whom they interact. When they engage in wrongdoing of global 
concern, they often do so as the putative protectors of the very principles that they violate.130 As 
such, like state actors, JPEs undermine their own existential foundation when they violate core 
global human values.131 And, as in the unilateral context, the zealous exercise of the levers of 
control by which JPE wrongdoing might be prevented – levers like training, discipline, personnel 
selection, leadership, and so on – do not carry the inherent threat to global human values that is 
130  For example, Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective 
Accountability,’ n. 3, at 119-20. 
131 Ibid. 
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posed by the zealous exercise of state power to prevent private actors from engaging in similar 
wrongs. 
Ultimately, then, just as it is important that the public acts or omissions of a state organ be 
attributed to that state even when the individual perpetrators act ultra vires, so it is for the same 
reasons important that official JPE conduct be attributed to one or more of the participating states 
and international organisations. In a sense, this conclusion is uncontroversial; as canvassed in 
section 3, the need to attribute enterprise acts to at least one participant is widely accepted. The 
debate is over what this entails.  
Recognising the foundational importance of the reciprocity between public power and preventive 
responsibility illuminates that choice. Attributing JPE wrongdoing based on the reciprocity 
principle would align JPE legal responsibility with the deeper normative sense of institutional 
responsibility manifest in adjacent legal contexts. It would affirm and entrench the contemporary 
reframing of public power as a trigger for international responsibility, rather than a shield against 
international interference.  
This matters because legal responsibility for inflicting wrongs of global public concern carries 
with it condemnation. Fairness to the legally responsible state demands that attribution with such 
wrongdoing reflect some basic principle of organisational moral responsibility. Fairness to those 
wronged demands the same, particularly in light of the fact that a core aspect of reparation for 
such wrongs is the ‘satisfaction’ of an official judgment holding the responsible party to 
account. 132  From both perspectives, ex post legal responsibility ought to reflect a plausible 
account of deeper moral responsibility. Founding attribution on the reciprocity principle does that 
in a way that preserves normative consistency across adjacent domains of international legal 
responsibility. 
An additional perspective from which any attribution regime should be evaluated is 
consequentialist. As a matter of global public order, and to the extent that legal responsibility 
creates incentives for state and international organisations action, those incentives ought to be 
balanced so as to deter JPE wrongs without undermining international cooperation.  
132  For example, Bosnian Genocide, n. 16, paras. 460-462. On its value to human rights claimants, see T. 
Dannenbaum, ‘The International Criminal Court, Article 79, and Transitional Justice’ (2010) 28 WILJ 234, at 281-
286; Comiteau, ‘Court Says the Dutch are to Blame for Srebrenica Deaths’, n. 127.  
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In each of these respects, the preventive control standard introduced in section 3 is superior to its 
four alternatives. Stated most succinctly, this rule attributes JPE wrongs to any participant state(s) 
or international organisation(s) holding a sufficient concentration of the lawful levers of control 
relevant to preventing the type of wrongful conduct in question. The recent use of something like 
this test in the Dutch courts is an important step forward, but it lacks specificity, and leaves the 
contours of the standard largely undefined. 133  The framework below elaborates a more 
comprehensive vision. 
The analysis starts with a typology of enterprise conduct. That classification is necessarily 
enterprise-specific, but it typically includes: (i) conduct pursuant to commands or directions that 
generate a duty to obey (as is typical); (ii) conduct pursuant to commands or directions that 
generate a duty to disobey (such as manifestly criminal orders); (iii) conduct pursuant to 
authorisations creating a sphere of discretion that includes the wrongful conduct; (iv) conduct 
ultra vires; and (v) conduct caused by resource constraints or intra-enterprise excuse.134 The 
attribution analysis builds on this classification in four steps. 
Step 1: In the case of conduct undertaken pursuant to a command, direction, or authorisation 
[conduct (i-iii)], the analysis would identify whether the initial mandate to perform the wrong 
originated outside of the enterprise [step 1] or within the enterprise [step 2]. If the former, the 
wrongful conduct would be attributed to the state or international organisation whose organ 
proclaimed the initial requirement or permission.  
Additional lines of attribution could then be layered on top of this baseline. First, if the command 
or direction were such as to trigger a duty to disobey [conduct (ii)], then the state(s) or 
international organisation(s) holding preventive control over the obedient executors of the order 
or directive would also be attributed with the conduct [see step 3]. Similarly, if the conduct were 
within the scope of the natural perpetrators’ organisational discretion [conduct (iii)], the state(s) 
or international organisation(s) with preventive control over those natural persons would also be 
attributed with the conduct [see step 3]. However, conduct occurring pursuant to a command or 
direction not generating a duty to disobey [conduct (i)], would not be attributed to any actors 
133 Dannenbaum, ‘Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct’, n. 3, at 
719-27; 1XKDQRYLü Supreme Court, n. 42, paras. 3.11.3, 3.12.2, 3.12.3. 
134 Applying this to peacekeeping, see Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of 
Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 158-83. 
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other than the state(s) or international organisation(s) from which the mandate originated. 
Step 2: Suppose, however, that the order requiring or authorising the wrongful conduct 
originated within the enterprise. This would raise two alternative possibilities: either the intra-
enterprise actor who originated the wrongful order acted within her mandate, or she acted ultra 
vires. If she acted within her mandate in issuing the wrongful command, direction or 
authorisation, then the analysis would proceed precisely as in step 1 to identify the originator of 
that permissive mandate, with the same consequences for attribution. If, on the other hand, she 
acted ultra vires, then the analysis would proceed as stipulated in step 3. 
Step 3: A preventive control analysis would be applied to all official conduct ultra vires and to 
the scenarios identified in the paragraphs immediately above. As in unilateral action, this would 
involve a strict responsibility analysis, not a vigilance test. Rather than examining the 
reasonableness of the efforts taken to prevent the wrongful conduct, it would require an 
assessment of the de jure and de facto distributions of the levers of control relevant to preventing 
that type of wrong. Those state(s) or international organisation(s) with a concentration of such 
levers would be attributed with responsibility, regardless of how they actually exercised their 
control. The levers of control relevant to this analysis would vary depending on the enterprise and 
the impugned conduct.135 In many scenarios they would include: disciplinary authority; authority 
over personnel selection; authority to structure enterprise subunits; authority over training; 
authority to dismiss individuals from the enterprise; authority to select enterprise leaders; 
responsibility for enterprise legal advice; and criminal jurisdiction.136  
The rule of step 3 is that all states or international organisations holding a concentration of these 
levers of preventive control over one or more enterprise members involved in the wrongful 
conduct (except those acting pursuant to orders that did not trigger a duty to disobey [conduct 
(i)]) would be attributed with the conduct. The rare scenario in which none of the participant 
states or international organisations holds a sufficient concentration of preventive levers is 
135 Wrongs in Tilburg Prison, Mediterranean Frontex patrols, United Nation Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo peacekeeping, and International Security Assistance Force operations demand different preventive 
mechanisms, as do criminal and non-criminal wrongs. 
136 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, at 
160-64; Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, n. 70, para. 23. In aggregate, the Hague Court of Appeal and the 
ILC have recognised most of these as relevant to attribution. 1XKDQRYLü Court of Appeal, n. 42, para. 5.10; ARIO, n. 
4, at 87-88. See also 1XKDQRYLü Supreme Court, n. 42, paras. 3.10.2, 3.11.3. 
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discussed in section 7, below. 
Step 4: The final step applies a special rule to wrongdoing caused by ‘intra-enterprise excuse’. In 
this scenario, a subunit or individual member of the JPE is forced to engage in the wrongful 
conduct by necessity, duress, or an equivalent excuse, the conditions of which were caused by 
another JPE participant. Responsibility in this scenario would take one of two forms, depending 
on the legal status of the excuse-creating act. When that act is unlawful, responsibility for the 
excused act would be determined by applying steps 1-3 to the excuse-creating actor. However, 
when the excuse-creating act is lawful, responsibility reverts instead to the state or international 
organisation with overall operational control of the enterprise, because such wrongs are best 
prevented through operational coordination. 
This four-step framework provides for shared attribution in a range of scenarios.137 On the private 
dimension of responsibility, this raises the question of liability apportionment – a vexed issue 
given the obstacles to enforcing international contribution and indemnity. However, public 
responsibility need not be apportioned at all; attribution to one entity does not dilute simultaneous 
attribution to another. Thus, although the method for sharing liability is important (and almost 
certainly requires a scheme of joint and several liability), the specifics of such a scheme are 
beyond the scope of this Chapter. 
Ultimately, the virtues of the proposed framework are twofold. First, it reflects the normative 
reciprocity described above; when a state or international organisation holds a sufficient 
concentration of levers of preventive control over those involved in a JPE, its strict responsibility 
is to ensure that they do not participate in wrongdoing of global concern. Second, by holding 
responsible only the entities best placed to prevent the wrongdoing, the proposed framework 
calibrates incentives so as to recognise not just the importance of deterrence, but also the global 
value of international collaboration.138 
It is worth pausing to reflect on the importance of international cooperation because it in fact 
informs both of these virtues. An advocate of broader attribution might respond to the discussion 
137 On shared ‘effective control’, see Al-Jedda, n. 28, para. 80; 1XKDQRYLü Court of Appeal, n. 42, para. 5.9; 
1XKDQRYLüSupreme Court, n. 42, para. 3.11.2; ARIO, n. 4, at 83. 
138 In the absence of significant financial reparations, deterrence may occur through condemnation, other reparations, 
or outcasting. On the latter: O.A. Hathaway and S. Shapiro, ‘Outcasting’ (2011) 121 YLJ 252.  
28  
                                                        
above by observing that the distribution of levers of preventive control in a JPE is itself the result 
of a collective choice by all participants. States contributing peacekeepers cede operational 
control to the UN; New Zealand and Britain ceded administrative control over Nauru to 
Australia; contributors to a Frontex mission cede control to Frontex and the host state; and the 
UN and contributing states often cede operational control of a Chapter VII authorised military 
force to a lead state or international organisation. 
The objection has force. After all, when states cede control over public functions to private 
actors, they do not escape responsibility for wrongdoing by those actors.139 Relinquishing their 
preventive authority in that way is just another way of failing to take adequate preventive 
measures. The fact that the failure occurs earlier in the process is immaterial. Analogous 
reasoning in the JPE context has underpinned arguments in favour of attributing the UN with all 
acts of UN-authorised military forces, even when the UN cedes operational control to one of the 
participant states or international organisations. 140  Framed in this way, authorial control is 
depicted as an element of preventive control. Indeed, one might take the point further and argue 
that even non-authorial, contributing states have a preventive power in that they voluntarily cede 
control over their organs or agents when they second them to an enterprise over which they do 
not have complete control. Here, too, the contributing state could have made its contribution 
conditional on retaining total control over its personnel. 
Insightful though this objection is, four reasons militate in favour of an attribution framework 
that reflects only the actual distribution of the levers of control in the JPE as negotiated, not 
authorial or contributory status (and the implicit power to have designed a different structure). 
First, a state’s delegation of public functions to a private actor is not analogous to a state or 
international organisation ceding control to a JPE. Delegation to a private actor without 
preventive checks involves freeing the function from the preventive control of any international 
legal person. If such abdication were to relieve the state of responsibility, it would eliminate 
international responsibility for the function entirely. Relinquishing preventive control to another 
state or international organisation does not extinguish international responsibility; it merely 
changes the international legal person responsible. Second, as long as the participant(s) with 
139 ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 42-3. 
140 Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security, n. 31, at 164. 
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preventive control are attributed with the wrong, the framework fulfills the reciprocity principle 
and creates incentives for wrong prevention. Third, and crucially, ceding control is essential to 
rich and effective international collaboration, which is, in turn, vital to realising the promise of 
international law. Conversely, encouraging each venture participant to retain all levers of control 
and to interfere preventively in JPE functioning would undermine the advancement of global 
values. Fourth, the application of preventive due diligence can address the core danger of 
responsibility evasion without thereby undermining international cooperation. 
The final two points warrant greater elaboration – the third here, the fourth in section 7. The vital 
role of thick international cooperation in realising international law’s core objectives is manifest 
in a broad range of cooperative ventures, including many JPEs.141 Indeed, the enforcement of 
international law is itself dependent on effective international collaboration.142 And yet, the very 
reason that cooperation is so vital – the absence of a global sovereign – is also one of the key 
reasons it is so difficult to achieve and sustain. International collaboration requires states 
ordinarily subject to little superior coercion to cede control to other states and international 
organisations in contexts in which they often have significant interests. This can be achieved only 
through careful negotiation and compromise – a process over which no participant has unilateral 
control. 
It is a mistake to assume that because the United Nations, for example, holds authorial control 
over a multilateral military force, that it therefore has the power to determine the distribution of 
levers of control. Its options are determined through negotiation, and they are most likely to be 
limited to first, an operation in which it cedes control and second, no operation at all. For the 
same reason, many states will rarely have the realistic option of retaining greater control over 
their contributions to a JPE. The options facing a state considering sending a contingent of border 
guards on a Frontex mission may be to withhold the contingent altogether, or to accept that it 
must cede some levers of control to Frontex and the host state. 
It would be unfair and counterproductive to human values to attribute conduct to a state or 
international organisation whose only modes of preventive action would have been to refuse to 
participate in a lawful collaboration under the agreed terms, to violate those terms, or to withdraw 
141 See Introduction and section 2. 
142 Hathaway and Shapiro, ‘Outcasting’, n. 138. 
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from the venture altogether.143 Moreover, even when a given state or organisation could negotiate 
the retention of total control over its contributions to a lawful JPE, it would rarely be desirable 
that it do so. Quite the contrary, the unification of decision-making and control in collaborative 
ventures augments their efficacy and coherence.144 Some of the gravest cases of JPE wrongdoing 
have occurred in ventures in which control was insufficiently unified and integrated.145  
Given the value of international cooperation and the challenge of achieving it, as long as control 
is held by at least one participant with international legal personality, as long as legal obligations 
are not circumvented, and as long as the right to reparation is not nullified, a preventive control 
analysis ought to reflect the actual distribution of control agreed by participants, not a hypothesis 
about what authorial or other entities might or might not have relinquished in an alternative 
enterprise structure. Deference to the compromise that was reached is an important virtue. 
Preventive control has important advantages over the alternative attribution frameworks for JPE 
wrongdoing. By incorporating the reciprocity principle, it aligns legal JPE responsibility with the 
deeper moral underpinnings of legal responsibility in adjacent domains. By tying responsibility to 
prevention, it provides the best framework for deterrence. And by applying sharing attribution 
only when the nature of the conduct and the distribution of powers are such that multiple actors 
directed the action or held significant levers of preventive control, it honors the imperative of 
international collaboration.  
 
7. Addressing the limits of the preventive control framework  
Despite these virtues, three potential objections to the proposed attribution framework warrant 
attention. First, it may be vulnerable to manipulation by powerful states. Second, its conduct-
sensitivity places a significant epistemic and evidentiary burden on claimants and adjudicators. 
Third, rare JPE wrongdoing may occur over which no entity holds a concentration of the levers of 
preventive control. 
143 See Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, 
at 189-90; Dannenbaum, ‘Finding Balance in the Attribution of Liability’, n. 3, at 107-11. 
144 ICISS Report, n. 6, para. 7.20. 
145 Ibid.; Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 
3, at 161; Dannenbaum, ‘Finding Balance in the Attribution of Liability’, n. 3, at 115-6. 
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The first worry is that powerful states would design enterprise structures so as to ensure sufficient 
influence to achieve their objectives, while avoiding the costs of responsibility for collateral 
wrongdoing. This threat is particularly pernicious in contexts in which the participant to which 
key levers of control are ceded is immune from legal action, is likely to be unmoved by 
international responsibility, is too weak to exercise that control effectively, is insolvent, or is 
unbound by the relevant legal regime. 
This danger is genuine, but it does not weigh against the preventive control model. On the 
contrary, with the sole exception of blanket multiple attribution (which itself poses a severe threat 
to international cooperation), the alternative attribution regimes discussed in section 3 are all 
significantly more vulnerable to manipulation of this kind. A preventive control test involves 
conduct-specific, factual analysis, and ignores the formal ceding of authority unless it reflects a 
genuine transfer of factual control. In contrast, the operational and especially authorial control 
tests enable powerful states to cede de jure authority and thereby wash their hands of 
responsibility, despite retaining robust factual influence over enterprise conduct. States are 
traditionally more reluctant to relinquish many of the levers of preventive control described 
above than they are willing to cede formal authority. And when they do relinquish those factual 
elements of control, they lose considerable influence over enterprise activity. In short, although 
manipulation cannot be eliminated, the proposed regime is structured to guard against it while 
continuing to encourage international cooperation. 
Moreover, the attribution regime would not operate in isolation. As in the case of unilateral 
action, it would work alongside preventive vigilance requirements. Under that two-level analysis, 
JPE participants not attributed with the conduct would be assessed for whether they exercised 
vigilance in ensuring the lawful conduct of the enterprise, or whether they should have engaged 
in reasonable preventive measures, such as applying diplomatic pressure on their co-participants 
or assisting under-resourced states with training or other support.146 In addition to combating 
manipulation, this would recognise the escalating responsibility of all participant states and 
international organisations to act preventively as wrongdoing becomes increasingly endemic to 
an enterprise. Unlike blanket joint attribution, however, it would avoid undermining desirable 
collaboration.  
146 Cf. ,ODúFX, n. 13, paras. 333, 336-52.  
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Supplementary vigilance analysis of this sort could be particularly useful in the context of UN 
peacekeeping. Although more likely to attribute wrongful peacekeeper conduct to troop-
contributing states than most other attribution regimes, the preventive control framework does 
attribute wrongful conduct exclusively to the UN in some contexts.147 Given UN immunity, and 
the woeful inadequacy of the internal claims system, an accountability gap remains in those 
scenarios. 148  However, under a supplementary vigilance standard, states might be held 
responsible for failing to pressure the organisation to institute a robust and transparent claims 
review system.149  
Preventive vigilance could also provide the basis for the responsibility of states and organisations 
that contribute to JPEs through means other than personnel. Depending on the likelihood of 
misuse, the provision of resources, objects, or even territory may generate obligations on 
contributing states to seek assurances and impose conditions on the use of their contributions, or 
to withhold those contributions if it becomes apparent they are being misused.150 
A second danger of the preventive control framework is epistemic. Authorial control, operational 
control, and blanket multiple attribution all provide victims with clarity as to the party liable for 
JPE wrongdoing. Simply knowing that the JPE perpetrated the violation is enough to know which 
entity to sue. Conduct-specific tests lack that clarity. The preventive control test, in particular, 
requires an case-by-case assessment of the de facto and de jure distributions of the levers of 
control with respect to each wrong (not to mention the complication of intra-enterprise excuse). 
This is a genuine procedural disadvantage of the system. However, precisely because that 
disadvantage is procedural, it is best remedied with a procedural, rather than a substantive, 
response – namely, adopting a victim friendly evidentiary presumption on attribution. Given that 
state and international organisation participants in a JPE have greater knowledge of the 
147 See Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability’, n. 3, 
at 165-83. 
148 Ibid., at 121-29. 
149 The UN’s Model Status of Forces Agreement provides for such a mechanism, but none has ever been instituted. 
Secretary-General, Draft Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations, UN Doc. A/45/594 
(1990), Article 51. 
150 By way of analogy see sources and discussion at n. 71, above, on non-refoulement. Peacekeeping operations are 
often funded and equipped by states that do not send troops. Troop and Police Contributors at 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml; Financing Peacekeeping at 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml (last accessed 5 June 2014). On territory, consider the 
Tilburg prison, n. 9.  
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distribution and use of the relevant levers of preventive control in specific operations than does 
any claimant or court, once a JPE wrong is proven, it would be just to shift to the defendant state 
or international organisation the burden of establishing that it did not hold the relevant levers of 
control over the impugned conduct.151 
The final danger of the framework is that of non-attribution in the case that no state or 
international organisation holds a concentration of the relevant levers of preventive control over 
certain enterprise wrongs – whether due to private contracting or an unusually fragmented 
enterprise structure. Despite the general advantages of basing attribution on the actual power 
distribution that is negotiated and applied by enterprise participants, it would be a mistake to 
leave such conduct unattributed.152  
As noted above, the fact that the preventive control ‘relinquished’ by participants in JPEs is 
ordinarily taken up by others with international personality is one of the key reasons it makes 
sense to focus on the actual negotiated structure of preventive control. When that context does 
not apply, the case for reverting to an authorial control test strengthens. Simultaneously, the 
reasons against authorial control weaken. First, attribution to authorial entities would be the only 
way of deterring wrongful conduct in that context, and may stimulate the repossession of 
preventive control by one or more participants. Second, a joint enterprise with a widespread lack 
of preventive control is less likely the result of a carefully brokered compromise among entities 
reluctant to cede control, and more likely the result of states or international organisations 
deliberately insulating themselves from responsibility. Third, the value of lawful international 
cooperation loses its overriding normative weight when it is attainable only through the creation 
of entities that exercise public power in a way that is invisible to international law, out of control, 
and shielded from responsibility or accountability. Ultimately, then, when a JPE is structured to 
eliminate the levers of preventive control, authorial states and international organisations must be 
attributed with its wrongful conduct. 
 
151 Several international authorities have applied or advocated evidentiary burden shifting in the interests of justice. 
Corfu Channel, n. 13, at 18; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2003, 161, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para. 68; Velásquez-Rodriguez, n. 69, paras. 135-36; 
ARSIWA Commentary, n. 2, at 72. 
152 Ibid., at 42-3; ARIO, n. 4, at 88, 95. 
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8. Conclusion 
The reciprocity between claimed or asserted public power and preventive responsibility has 
grown in importance as a moral foundation of legal responsibility in contemporary international 
law. Its standing in a world of plural values emphasises its merit and viability as the normative 
basis from which to develop a regime of responsibility for the wrongs of joint public enterprises. 
With a few caveats outlined in section 7, enterprise wrongs ought to be attributed to the 
participant states or organisations that hold the levers of control most relevant to preventing the 
type of wrongdoing in question. This regime builds on the reciprocity between public power and 
preventive responsibility while affirming the importance of thick international collaboration in 
advancing international law. 
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